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characterised by strong ideals and anti-German sentiment watered down by the practicalities of occupation. 12 As Christopher Knowles illustrates, while moral imperatives did have their place in the public discourse about how to handle Germany after the war, 13 the vicissitudes of the postwar era meant that priorities and policies were usually governed, in the end, by pragmatism. This article will demonstrate this by showing the evolution of the British handling of German science, which underwent restriction, denazification, exploitation and reconstructionapproaches that were separate but overlapping, and which each enjoyed a period of favour and dominance, depending on ha gi g o ditio s a d a p ag ati eadi g of hi h ould est se e B itai s u e t i te ests.
Restriction and Demilitarisation
For the entire duration of the Third Reich, and especially during the Second World War, science in Germany was closely directed by the state, and this oversight even extended into semiautonomous organisations such as the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Society. As indicated above, Nazi
Germany excelled at mobilising its scientific resources, both material and human, and, whether the focus was on new weapons, such as rockets or atomic bombs, or on less obviously military topics, such as synthetic rubber production or agricultural techniques, much of this research was geared towards aidi g Ge a s a effo t. 14 wrote that he disagreed with such castigatory schemes on three grounds: fi stl , e ause a great deal of German research, even in the last 12 years, has been of benefit to the whole of hu a it ;
secondly, Haldane hoped that the Ge a s ill ulti atel take their place among the civilised peoples a d elie ed they could not do this without intellectual culture, which includes scienceas an example, he cited biological education as e essa to sho the utte falsit of Hitle s a ial theo ies ; a d thi dl , because of the length of time which it takes to put a discovery in fundamental science into practice, meaning that pure research itself posed no particular threat. Ultimately,
Haldane felt that the banning of certain types of applied science, the requirement of having a license for any research, and periodic inspections of facilities, without forewarning, would suffice to control German science. 17 Joseph Kenworthy, Baron Strabolgi, sha ed Halda e s view and dismissed more restrictive suggestio s as i p a ti a le a d as Utopia as the Morgenthau plan for confining Ge a to ag i ultu e a d pasto al pu suits , oti g, ho e e , that the e as o easo h e
should not keep a e e o the a d o t ol the . 18 Indeed, even Ba o Va sitta t s p oposed precautions were remarkably moderate -he suggested establishing an inter-Allied committee of s ie tists, hose espo si ilit it ould e to e a i e a d o t ol, a d if e essary to prohibit the use by Germany of, any scientific discovery or invention considered dangerous to the safety of a ki d . 19 It was this outlook which formed the basis of policy, at least initially, mirroring similar strategies regarding other areas of German life, such as education. 20 As such, a plethora of committees and agencies were established by the British to develop and enforce these comparatively rational measures of scientific control.
The German Science and Industry Committee (GSIC) had been appointed in August 1944 to consider questions both of scientific control and industrial disarmament. They acknowledged the close link between industry and war potential, and recommended a policy of constant watchfulness to ensure no new research areas with military connotations were permitted to arise. 21 The Scientific 
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As a result, thinking on this subject began to change. At the end of April, as Law No. 25 was promulgated, Research Branch began to ad o ate a conception of control which was not merely the negative one of preventing the Germans from doing undesirable things ut also taki g positive action to provide conditions in which German research can develop along the right line . Indeed, this was not entirely a new idea. In September 1945, both the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the GSIC ad a ed the ie that a purely restrictive policy will not achieve the desired ends a d ould likely eate conditions of unrest and rancour a o g the s ie tifi o u it -a sector of the German population which the occupying officials were most keen to encourage. Their report continued that although the e should e important measures of prohibition, limitation and control in certain fields which may have a military significance, there should be no restriction of German scientific activity for peaceful ends . 27 This was in alignment with British policy on education -while the occupation authorities acknowledged the extent to which it had been poisoned by Nazi ideology, they also saw its revival as essential to the restoration of peace and democracy in Germany.
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This more reasonable approach tended to prevail and, as a result, the harsher, stricter elements of policy were accompanied by more positive and conciliatory tactics, which sought to rehabilitate German science and incorporate it back into the global community. Beyond this, the occupation authorities were also concerned, as they were throughout the initial post-war period, with striking the balance between weakening Germany as a potential aggressor while still building an economy which allowed for a decent standard of living. 35 This dilemma can be clearly seen in the handling of the colossal and technologicallyadvanced German conglomerate, IG Farben, which had strong links with the Nazi regime and had indeed profited from the use of concentration camp slave labour in its factories. It was considered of such great importance that all four occupying powers set up a quadripartite commission to investigate its activities, and while the IG was formally liquidated, many of its constituent parts were allowed to live on under new identities and many of its directors were rehabilitated, even after they were found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity by Allied courts. 36 Overall, industrial disarmament strategies had a very direct bearing on British approaches to German science, which was seen as both the source of perhaps the most significant threat which Germany could offer in its comprehensively defeated condition, and, through its close connections with industry and business, as ha i g a i po ta t ole to pla i Ge a s e o o i eha ilitation. If, however, German science was going to be in a position to contribute towards the rebuilding of a strong, prosperous and diplomatically stable nation, all traces of the Nazi regime had to be purged from within it.
Denazification
This ideological purge took the form of comprehensive policies of denazification, pursued by all four
Allies during the period of occupation, and designed to remove what was seen as a toxic political influence from all spheres of German life. This encompassed many different activities, such as the demolition of monuments to the Third Reich and the changing of street names which glorified prominent Nazis, but its main focus was directed towards people. Generally speaking, this entailed removing individuals tainted by a Nazi past from any positions of authority -teachers, civil servants, lawyers and so on -as well as attempting a widespread programme of re-education, ostensibly to show the German people what was wrong with Nazi ideology and prepare them for a peaceful democratic future. 37 Unsurprisingly, every aspect of denazification, from the basic premise to the practicalities of implementation, was a source of some controversy and the debate over both its validity as a concept and its effectiveness has been engaged in as thoroughly in historical literature
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as it was among contemporary observers. 38 Of particular note is the fact that the British soon developed a reputation for having a lenient attitude towards denazification, in part because they believed low-ranking ex-Nazis would be more amenable to taking orders from the occupiers than other political denominations, such as communists. 39 It has been convincingly argued that this app oa h as i spi ed, i o s all pa t, B itai s e pe ie e as a i pe ial po e , wherein local elites, who had sometimes previously fought against them, were relied upon to maintain law and order, provide intelligence and handle lower-level administration in the colonies. 40 One problem, which plagued the entire process of denazification, was assessing, or defining, who exactly constituted a Nazi. 41 The denazification of German science was no exception and the overriding question for the occupation authorities was to what extent German scientists were actually implicated in the crimes of the Third Reich. Despite the multiple contributions which the scientific community had made to the German war effort, there was a widespread belief that most
German scientists had not supported Nazism, or had in some cases directly opposed it. In September 1946, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff voiced the opinion that denazification of science would hardly be e essa as f o a politi al poi t of ie the e o ds of s ie tists as a lass e e easo a l good 42 . The US National Academy of the Sciences took this even further, believing that the scientific community had withdrawn into their ivory tower during the Third Reich and thus composed an isla d of o -o fo it ithi the egi e. 43 Others preferred to view the situation in more abstract terms -scientists, especially physicists, were to be seen as little more than tools, and tools could not be Nazified or denazified. 44 This was indicative of a wider re-evaluation of the moral leadership and institutional governance of modern science, taking place in Britain and elsewhere and sparked by the complex entanglement of science and state during the Second World War. 45 This uncertainty and introspection translated into practical action, or the distinct lack of it. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society (KWS; later rebranded as the Max Planck Society), for instance, was left to largely denazify itself, which led to it further promoting the view that all German scientists had either resisted the Nazi regime or were victims of it. 46 This is not as disingenuous as it may at first appear. There were many examples of German scientists who genuinely did ot succumb to the temptation and threat of tyranny a d p essu e was exerted, frequently by their peers in Britain or the USA, to rescue these men from the destitution which often befell them following the end of the war and the subsequent ban on much scientific research. Among these was Otto Heubner, a professor of pharmacology from Berlin who had ended up living in a poor situation in Hamburg after the war. An old colleague of his, Otto
Krayer, who had fled the Nazis and had become a professor of pharmacology at Harvard, wrote to Sir Charlie Hall
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Henry Dale, a fellow pharmacologist and outgoing President of the Royal Society, and asked for assistance to be rendered to Heubner, describing him as a representative of the spiritual and intellectual forces, who, if saved from a miserable fate, can be valuable in the restoration in the allembracing community of science 47 . Dale sha ed K a e s assess e t a d, i passi g the e uest fo aid on to the ele a t ad i ist ati e odies, e a ked ho Heubner and his wife, in fact, both trailed their coats to the Nazis , such as by refusing to give the Hitler salute at the beginning of lectures, and somehow were left unmolested. 48 These appeals obviously had the desired effect as, in March 1946, after almost six months of the case being passed through bureaucratic channels,
Heubner was offered a Chair at the University of Bonn.
Not all scientists from the Allied countries were so quick to render support and assistance to their German peers, and not all held the view that science had largely been exempt from the horrors of the Nazi regime. In December 1947, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Philip Morrison, professor of physics at Cornell University, provided a damning indictment of German science, in which he did not question their implication in Nazi crimes:
… no different from their Allied counterparts, the German scientists worked for the military as best their circumstances allowed. But the difference, which it will never be possible to forgive, is that they worked for the cause of Himmler and Auschwitz, for the burners of books and the takers of hostages.
The community of science will be long delayed in welcoming the armorers of the Nazis, even if their work was not successful. 49 In In terms of execution, the denazification of science can be seen to go through four stages, beginning with the initial arrests of scientists and confiscation of their materials; followed by summary dis issals o e fo ed self-lea si g ope atio s; the the ha di g o e of the ge e al administration of denazification to German officials, with only minimal Allied oversight; and finally, Generally speaking, the British had a reputation for clemency and many Germans with dubious pasts travelled to the British zone, especially from the American zone, to avoid harsher punishment. 54 Nonetheless, across the British zone, denazification measures were criticised for punishing individuals whose co-operation Britain sought in the rebuilding of a healthy, prosperous and democratic Germany as well as more generally damaging the relationship between occupiers and occupied. 55 Indeed, in January 1947, when the Scientific Committee for Germany registered its o e that serious anomalies had occurred in the denazification of German scientists , their fear was not that politically tainted scientists were escaping punishment, but rather that the judgements passed on them were too severe, therefore hampering British recruitment of these men, or making them inaccessible altogether. 56 The situation was further compounded by the growing competition ith the 'ussia s fo Ge a s s ie tifi esou es, as evidenced by remarks made by the director of Research Branch, Bertie Blount -how successful our denazification policy, as carried out by the clever young men of Intelligence Division, is being in driving ability and intelligence into the ranks of ou e e ies . He even accused the men of Intelligence Division of being socialists who saw a
Ge a s ie tist s dislike of 'ussia a d lose a uai ta e ith la ded p op ieto s a d ig usi ess e as evidence of his political criminality and thus suitable grounds for his punishment under denazification laws. 57 Others sha ed Blou t s dismay that Britain might suffer, to the benefit of their former ally, as It is fai to sa that this lite al adhe e e as ot espe iall e ide t i the B itish zo e ut C e e s o e ts e eal that the e idea of it as see as i i i al to B itish interests. Alongside this criticism from the British authorities, denazification also faced increasing opposition from the German public during this period, even to the extent of active protest from certain sectors of society, such as the Protestant churches. in their ultimate termination, long before the work which they had set out to do had been completed. 60 The British were not the only occupier to alter their policy in this way; a similar reconfiguration took place in the American zone too. 61 While this change in attitudes contributed to de azifi atio s deepe i g u popula it , it simultaneously added much greater support to response to criticism of the employment of politically questionable German experts in Britain. He declared I am willing to risk their being Nazis -and I think they probably are -so long as they are highly skilled technicians who will teach our people something which they did not previously know.
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Exploitation and Reparations
As Jo itt s de la atio suggests, along with the desire to denazify Germany and prevent another global conflict, there was also a wish to profit from Germany in order to offset some of the costs incurred by the Allies in their fight against the Third Reich, and during the post-war occupation. The main lesson learned from the First World War was that it was ineffective to demand reparations in direct financial form -instead, payment in kind was to be encouraged. 63 Initially, it was intended that this would take the form of capital equipment, dismantled and shipped abroad, and this would then be followed by annual deliveries of goods from current German production. 64 At the Potsdam Conference, which took place between the leaders of Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1945, the USA took a leading role in negotiating an Allied reparations agreement. During the war, the American economy had grown enormously and issues of surplus rather than scarcity were anticipated for the post-war period -as such, traditional reparations, in the form of plant, machinery, labour, or goods, were not only uninteresting to the US but genuinely undesirable. However, as it had been decided that reparations were a political goal in Germany, the US pushed for rewards which they could actually use, including patents, processes a d te h i al know-ho of e e t pe . 65 Science and technology therefore figured very highly in assessments of valuable reparations, for the British as well as the Americans. In fact, as early as March 1944, the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant-General Ronald Weeks, had predicted that
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be possible to exact from Germany . 66 Scientific and technological reparations, particularly those pertaining to military research, soon garnered much favour among the occupation authorities and one clear reason for this was that they represented something of a compromise between the potentially conflicting aims of weakening Ge a s ilitary power and maintaining its economic viability.
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links between demilitarisation and reparations that it was felt necessary to include within the official British policy statement an assertion that disa a e t easu es should be carried out regardless of thei effe t o Ge a s apa it to ake epa atio fo the da age she has do e . 68 In short, reparations could contribute to demilitarisation but should always remain a secondary concern behind limiti g Ge a s apa it to age agg essi e a . Seizing intellectual property as reparations was even more problematic, not only because it was notoriously difficult to assign with financial value, but also because it was harder to justify on a moral or political basis. It could not be considered as direct restitution for losses incurred during the war nor were those most likely to profit from the post-war transfer of intellectual property generally the same people or groups who had suffered most severely during the war. 69 Further complicating matters was the fact that the reparations scheme was not the only way in which the British could remove what they wanted from Germany. In fact, under the occupation, there were three permissible ways in which material could be removed from Germany: it could be taken as reparations, as long as it passed through all the necessary official international channels; it ould e paid fo i app o ed u e as a st aightfo a d e po t; o , if ega ded as oot , it ould be removed outside the reparations p o edu e a d ithout pa e t . Naturally, this last option as the ost att a ti e. Ho e e , the ate ial i uestio had to ualif as oot fo this oute to be legitimate -the gi e defi itio of oot as: A s, unitions and implements of war, and all research and development facilities (including documents, material and training devices) relative the eto. What this loosely entailed in real terms was any equipment found within German research establishments concerned solely with warlike subjects, as well as certain industrial items required as prototypes or for further examination in Britain. 70 In fact, long before any formal international reparations agreement had come into practice, Britain and its allies had already been conducting operations to remove information and material of scientific and technological value from Germany. These actions, coming under the umbrella term of e ploitatio , had ee o du ted u e ous age ies o ki g a oss oth Ge a and the formerly Nazi-occupied territories since the summer of 1944. Once the war ended, the scope increased dramatically as the Third Reich lay defenceless and utterly vulnerable to these unscrupulous removals, and the administrative framework necessary to handle this programme in the Allied countries grew quickly to meet the demand. All the victorious powers took part in exploitation, with the USA and the Soviet Union operating on the broadest scale, but with Britain and France both making up for their comparatively limited resources with enthusiasm, perseverance and considerable ingenuity. 71 Unsurprisingly, exploitation operations, both on their own merit and in
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Exploitation took many forms during the post-war period and one of the most common involved teams of Allied experts in a certain field travelling to Germany, visiting numerous plants, laboratories and factories relevant to that field, examining equipment, documents and material, interviewing the staff, and then compiling final reports which served as a summary of progress made in that field in Germany since the start of the war. Initially, this approach was confined to military topics but was soon expanded to include those of civil industrial interest too. The work of these exploitation teams was often instrumental in deciding what should be taken as reparationse uip e t a d do u e tatio as see to o p ise a esse tial ou te pa t to the i dust ial intelligence gathered by these teams, and it was argued that the value of this intelligence would be se iousl edu ed ithout ha i g the ph si al ate ial fo pu poses of e pe i e t i B itai .
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While the exploitation of facilities and the removals (as reparations or booty) of plant, machinery, or other specialised equipment comprised an important part of British policy towards German science, it was dwarfed by another element of exploitation -the detention, interrogation and ultimate recruitment of German scientists and technicians. 73 Again, this extended into both the civilian and military spheres and was seen as a way to bring the greatest spoils of German expertise to Britain. It was mirrored by similar schemes to exploit the est a d ightest of Ge a s ilita , law enforcement, and intelligence communities, though these were often smaller and more covert.
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I itiall , it as o side ed that the se i e of these highl skilled Ge a s ought o e Government Departments is national property, like the specialised plant being seized as reparations o oot . 75 Later, however, private firms in Britain were permitted to hire German specialists directly, thus contributing to the notion that the exploitation programme simply served as a vehicle for industrial espionage, wherein British companies could profit at the expense of their erstwhile German rivals. 76 Moreover, Germany as a whole suffered as a result of the loss of its brightest scientific minds. These experts, who were perhaps in the best position to help rebuild German science after the war, and restore its reputation as a thriving hub of innovation and progress, left to seek their fortune elsewhere. There were exceptions to this rule -for example, the esteemed nuclear Ge a has to offe . 82 As a result of these concerns, the British instigated what became known as de ial poli , hi h e tailed sele ti g Ge a s ie tists for recruitment in the West, not necessarily because they had anything to offer Britain, but simply because they were to be prevented from going over to the Soviets. 83 On the whole, it can be argued that many aspects of British policy on post-war German science can only be understood in terms of the worsening relationship with the Soviet Union. 84 This as ot o l t ue i te s of e ploitatio , e uit e t a d de ial poli , ut also i that Ge a scientists who had been recruited by the Russians but allowed to return to Germany, were often seized by the British intelligence services as valuable sources of information on Soviet weapons programmes -as Paul Madd ell has it, the fi st post-war penetration of Soviet military capability by British intelligence was a by-product of its effort to complete the victory over Germany . 85 As has been shown above, denazification was an early victim to the overwhelming urge to secure the
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services of large numbers of German specialists and thus deny them to the Soviet Union and so was, at least at first, any plan for the domestic reconstruction of German science. It was considered foolhardy and dangerous to leave any German specialist of note on German soil, almost irrespective of which zone of occupation he resided in, lest he be taken off to the Soviet Union and put to work there. However, in time, perspectives changed and, as new strategies were developed to resist any Soviet encroachment into Europe, the reconstruction of German science -and the rebuilding of a strong and prosperous German nation more widely -began to be seen as an asset rather than a liability.
Reconstruction
The defining factor of this shift in priorities was the changing appraisal of the relative threat of Anglo-Soviet relations with foresight, prudence and exceptional rapidity . 87 One of the main outcomes of this change in perspective was that Germany all but ceased to be seen as a potential enemy and instead adopted a role of probable target for Soviet imperialism; this in turn meant that the transformation of Germany into a productive capitalist nation, which could act as a bulwark against communist expansion (while simultaneously defraying the considerable costs of the occupation), became a highly desirable outcome. 88 Arguably, the British reached this conclusion before their American partners and expended considerable effort trying to convince the US that the Soviets could not be trusted and that the swift revival of the western zones of Germany was essential, despite the risks. The overall intention of the plan was to effect a reduction in the level of German industry as a whole to a figure of about 50% of the 1938 level. 90 This approach was quickly viewed as overly restrictive and many occupation officials on the ground simply ignored it and instead pursued a more practical and humane approach, following their instinct to get the country up and running again. 91 This was reflected when the plan was revised in August 1947, as the new version acknowledged that under present conditions Germany cannot contribute her indispensable part to the economic rehabilitation of Europe as a whole .
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A major motive for this change in attitudes was the growing awareness that the financial benefit of dismantling, as advocated by proponents of both exploitation and industrial disarmament, was completely dwarfed by the advantages of reconstructing German industry to allow for national self-sufficiency. 93 This reconstructive approach to industry was echoed in other fields too -by midDecember 1945, despite the widespread structural damage and shortage of materials, all six universities in the British zone had reopened. 94 Additionally, most British officials believed that a strong, profitable and educated Germany was more resistant to communism, which in their opinion thrived on hunger, chaos and poverty. 95 Here again pragmatism had won out, as the more severe and punitive strategy proved unprofitable and ultimately unworkable in reality. Even so, Britain insisted on maintaining certain restrictions on German industry, ostensibly in the interests of preserving world peace but perhaps more accurately in the interests of B itai s own economic security and of retaining further breathing-space for British exports. 96 Although there were still lingering concerns about its possible contribution to German remilitarisation, generally speaking this new attitude in favour of revival extended to and included German science. In fact, many argued that a rehabilitated science would provide a democratising influence, foster educational reform and serve as a foundation for long-range economic viability, making it a very useful channel through which to facilitate German reconstruction. 97 From a political angle, some even felt that the inherent rationality of science rendered it diametrically opposed to tyranny, which was itself inherently irrational. 98 Bertie Blount of Research Branch, a firm advocate of reconstruction, put it thus:
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I think it is a defensible historical thesis that revolutions are successful in so far as they are able to use the talent of the previous regime. We seem unable to appreciate this and, if we are not careful, the only long term result will be to substitute one hostile authoritarian regime in Germany for another.
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This perspective offered a useful justification for a rehabilitation of science which was not even predicated on a particularly thorough expurgation of existing personnel, thus pushing denazification to the wayside. Moreover, the long-held scientific tradition of sharing knowledge promoted both openness and international co-operation; elements which were to be actively encouraged in the new revitalised Germany. Writing in Nature in February 1948, the Austrian-born British chemist to the revival of scientific activity in Germany.
In short, the reconstruction of German science was simply the final phase in a varied strategic approach to this issue in the British zone. It offered many benefits, not least that it was inexpensive and could offer a route towards a more stable and democratic post-war society, essential as the cost to Britain of supporting its zone for the first two years of occupation was approximately £140 million, an amount it could ill-afford in its own dire economic state after the war. 114 The only reservation which prevented this approach from being adopted as policy from the offset was that German science revived might contribute considerably to a German military resurgence. This concern was quickly swept away as the Soviet Union replaced Germany as the major threat to peace, and British interests, in Europe. Even as early as the summer of 1946, when the STRB were considering their policy towards German scientists, they expressed this view clearly:
e feel it is ost u likel i ie of Law No. 25 that those [scientists] left in Germany will become a future German war potential and our proposals are advocated solely with the object of denying them to others.prevent these men from contributing in any way to the Soviet Union which truly drove the British support for the reconstruction of German science after the war.
To conclude, it is clear to see that British approaches to German science followed a similar trajectory to other aspects of occupation policy, though there were often more drastic shifts between the different strategies adopted, marking science out as an area of greater contrast and complexity than the handling of other elements, such as politics or education. While Britain may have entered the occupation period with the intention to strip German science of any military capacity and to remove any trace of Nazi influence from its ranks, this crusade soon fell afoul of the exigencies of the period, most notably the rising threat of the Soviet Union. Stringent restrictions on the types of research which were permitted and the thorough denazification of scientific personnel were both seen to be incompatible with the new Cold War agenda, in which resisting Soviet imperialism and communist encroachment was top priority. Instead, the British sought to utilise the most important resources of German science for their own ends, facilitated through the exploitation process, while simultaneously preventing the Soviet Union from doing the same, as evidenced by the preponderance of de ial poli . E e afte si ea s of a , the desire to chastise, punish and extract reparations from Germany evaporated remarkably quickly, in the face of a new conflict looming on the horizon.
This was not just true with regards to German science, but more widely too; there is little doubt that the occupation was entered into with a commitment to several moral missionsdenazification, prosecuting war crimes, democratisation, re-education and many more -but the reality of the situation, not just the shift in international relations but also the considerable financial constraints of the period, meant that these noble aims had to be set aside in favour of simpler goals, such as making Germany self-sufficient and ensuring that its people did not starve or descend into anarchy. 116 As a result, although when the war ended the British sought to comprehensively exploit, thoroughly demilitarise and tightly restrict German science, rapidly changing circumstances, not least the deepening enmity between East and West, pushed the occupation authorities towards pragmatism, which meant that British approaches to German science in the latter part of the postwar period were far more practical, lenient and ultimately rehabilitative. While the Soviet Union remained a constant, growing threat throughout, the policies deemed most appropriate to face this new enemy changed often -in other words, perceived Cold War necessity both fuelled punitive and exploitative tactics in the early occupation period and then forced their decline in favour of reconstruction only a few years later. Be e he , Ge a " ie tists , .
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